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Abstract
Non-recourse borrowing leaves no room for Ponzi schemes, as shown by Araujo et al.
(Econometrica 70:1613–1638, 2002). This is not the case with recourse loans, for
which, in the event of default and on top of the foreclosure of the collateral, the
debtor’s estate can be seized or (in a way common in the GE literature) the debtor can
suffer utility penalties. We focus on the latter and show that infinite horizon equilibrium
with recourse exists in some interesting cases: (1) if utility penalties are low enough
and the collateral does not yield utility (for example, when it is a productive asset or
a security) or (2) for a nominal promise backed by real collateral (such as mortgages,
whose payments are not tied to a commodity price index).
Keywords Collateral · Ponzi schemes · Incomplete markets
JEL Classification D52 · D53 · G33
1 Introduction
The modern general equilibrium literature on default evolved mainly from two seminal
contributions, the Dubey et al. (2005) paper on utility penalties and the Geanakoplos
and Zame (1997) work on non-recourse borrowing. In an infinite horizon setup, non-
recourse loans have the appealing feature of being incompatible with Ponzi schemes,
at least for time- and state-separable preferences, as shown by Araujo et al. (2002).
Non-recourse is the rule for mortgages in thirteen states in the USA, but in all the
other states and in many countries mortgages are treated as recourse loans. Other
types of secured loans tend to be recourse: Collateralized borrowing for the purchase
of equipment usually requires a default insurance, while in the case of credit for the
purchase of securities default triggers personal bankruptcy.
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Recourse means that the defaulter’s personal estate can be seized by the creditors,
either entirely or in proportion to the outstanding debts that were not covered by the
value of the collateral at the time the default occurred. There may be other types of
default penalties, such as reputational effects, difficulties in applying for credit in the
future or even criminal consequences, that we can also see as a form of recourse that
ends up affecting the defaulter’s welfare. Utility penalties, introduced by Shubik and
Wilson (1977) and more recently modeled by Dubey et al. (2005) in a GE framework,
attempt to capture in utility terms the impact of all forms of recourse.
In the presence of utility penalties, collateral may not avoid a Ponzi game. In fact, the
penalties may induce agents to repay above the minimum of the promised payment
and the collateral value. Then, non-arbitrage cannot rule out that, at the borrowing
date, the secured loan would have a negative haircut (the collateral cost would be
lower than the loan). The resulting cash flow in an open end setting would give rise
to a Ponzi scheme. This is actually what happens when the promise is traded in the
examples by Páscoa and Seghir (2009) for utility penalties that make the maximal
default prohibitive. However, the argument that also ruled out no-trade outcomes in
Páscoa and Seghir (2009) was not correct and, as was pointed out by Martins-da-Rocha
and Vailakis (2012a), a no-trade equilibrium could be found by setting the delivery
rate at the minimal level, even though such expectation about the delivery rate is not
consistent with the harsh penalty. Once the equilibrium is refined, along the lines of
the refinement in Dubey et al. (2005), nonexistence of equilibrium prevails.
Our first contribution is to observe that the absence of pecuniary Ponzi schemes
is not enough for existence of equilibrium. The net gain that the borrower can have
at the borrowing moment consists of the loan net of collateral costs plus the utility
from consumption of the collateral. Such direct utility effect may allow for an infinite
horizon improvement strategy even when collateral costs outweigh the loan (as our
Example 1 illustrates). Under non-recourse, the whole current benefit had to be non-
positive, by non-arbitrage, as at the immediate next nodes new collateral values net of
effective repayment were always nonnegative.
In our second contribution, we find an upper bound on utility penalty coefficients
that make the collateral cost never fall below the promise price and existence of
equilibrium is, therefore, guaranteed, under these moderate penalties, provided that
the collateral does not give any utility (say it is a durable commodity with no utility
yields, as in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), a productive asset or a share in it, as in
Kubler and Schmedders (2003), or any real security in positive net supply that cannot
be short-sold, as in Fostel and Geanakoplos 2015). Actually, the recourse feature that
a utility penalty tries to capture is often observed in collateralized borrowing for the
purchase of equipment or securities.
Our third contribution allows for harsher penalties and for utility yields from the
consumption of the collateral. Moderate penalties are a strong condition as it makes
agents give maximal default (as in the model where utility penalties were absent).
However, equilibrium is compatible with partial default or no default, as illustrated
in Example 2, where the sum, across next nodes, of the marginal penalty effects
is dominated by the sum of the marginal income effects. The problem is that this
dominance depends on relative prices and there might be no room to choose relative
spot prices if these are already pinned down by market clearing.
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There is, nevertheless, an important case where there are degrees of freedom in
market clearing prices. It is the case where the promise is nominal, but the collateral
is a real asset. This case is relevant for mortgages, which should be regarded as loans
whose promised repayments are not adjusted by commodity price indices, and also for
credit for the purchase of shares. In finite-horizon economies, there is indeterminacy
in equilibrium with respect to the inflation rates. Now, high inflation rates across all the
next nodes devalue the promised payments but not the collateral and, therefore, reduce
the real value of default on which the penalty is applied. Our Example 3 illustrates
such equilibria with nominal promises.
Example 2 and our two existence results do not collide with the result by Ferreira and
Torres-Martinez (2010) on impossibility of recourse. Their result depends on collateral
costs being lower than the deflated value of recourse (the repayment in excess of the
minimal one) at the next nodes. It is interesting to note that such a condition had to
be introduced to make recourse impossible. In Example 2, collateral coefficients do
not satisfy such inequality and the haircut is zero (rather than negative as in Ferreira
and Torres-Martinez 2010), which does not allow for a Ponzi scheme (or generalized
version of it, since the collateral does not yield utility in this example). In Theorem 2,
borrowers’ repayment is always the minimal one, while in Theorem 3 it might not be,
but the promise is nominal and the result by Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010) does
not apply.
One may wonder how do our existence results stand in the face of the possibility
that trivial no-trade equilibria might be found. Dubey et al. (2005) showed that for
unsecured promises subject to utility penalties on default, a trivial equilibrium always
exists by setting promises prices, delivery rates and financial trades equal to zero.
Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2012a) found a no-trade incomplete markets equilib-
rium in an example with secured promises by setting the delivery rate at the minimal
level. When the horizon is finite or markets are complete, such no-trade equilibria are
trivially found but in infinite horizon incomplete markets that is not always the case,
as we illustrate in a companion paper (Páscoa and Seghir 2019). There we also pro-
pose a refinement of equilibrium, which is milder than the straightforward extension
to secured loans of the one in Dubey et al. (2005). Even so, the no-trade outcome
in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2012a) still fails to meet this refinement but there
exist refined versions for the equilibria we found in the main results of the current
paper.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 addresses individual optimality.
Section 4 presents the existence results. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Themodel
Consumers trade collateralized promises over a countably infinite tree D with finitely
many branches at each node. Let N0 = {0, 1, . . .} be the set of dates and ξ0 be the root
of the tree D. Given a node ξ ∈ D, let t(ξ) ∈ N0 be the date of node ξ . We denote
by D(ξ) the sub-tree that starts at ξ . We write ξ ′ > ξ if ξ ′ ∈ D(ξ) and ξ ′ = ξ . The
immediate successors of node ξ constitute the set ξ+ ≡ {η > ξ : t(η) = t(ξ) + 1}
while its immediate predecessor is denoted by ξ−. We will also use the notation
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DT ≡ {ξ ∈ D : t(ξ) = T } and DT ≡ ⋃Tt=0 Dt . For any real sequence (an), the
notation a ≫ 0 (or a ≪ 0) stands for (an) being a positive (negative, respectively)
sequence uniformly bounded away from zero.
At each node ξ a finite number G of commodities is traded together with a finite
set J of one-period promises. Let us start by assuming that promises have real returns.
This assumption will be modified later, in Sect. 4.3.
Let A jξ ∈ RG be the vector of promised real returns, per unit of the promise, at
node ξ .
Sales of promises are secured by collateral. For each promise j , we introduce
collateral requirements at each node ξ by specifying a vector C jξ ∈ RG of quantities
of the commodities that have to be pledged when selling one unit of promise j .
Actually, we would like to allow collateral to be not necessarily a durable good,
but possibly also a productive asset or a security in positive net supply that pays real
returns and cannot be short sold. This can be accommodated by treating securities
as if they were commodities that do not yield utility but transform into others at the
following nodes.
Formally, we define at each node ξ a transformation matrix Yξ , of type G.G,
indicating how commodities of the previous node convert into commodities of the
node ξ .
If commodities are not just durable goods, we may have a non-diagonal transfor-
mation matrix. If g is a durable good, the only non-null element in column (Yξ )g is
(Yξ )gg , equal to the depreciation factor. If g is a security, (Yξ )gg = 1 and, its nonneg-
ative dividends are given, for g′ = g, by (Yξ )g′g . We allow also for productive assets
[as in Kubler and Schmedders (2003)] which can be treated formally as commodities
whose non-null columns in Yξ matrices represent their productive returns on other
commodities.
Formally, the assumption on promises returns and collateral is the following.
Assumption [R].
(i) Promised returns are given by A jξ ∈ RG+, ∀ j ∈ J , ξ > ξ0.
(ii) At each node ξ , collateral must be posted in at least one g ∈ G for which the
column Y gη is non-null at every node η ∈ ξ+.
There is a finite set I of consumers whose endowments and preferences verify the
following assumptions.
Assumption [E]. Endowments of consumer i of commodity g at node ξ , denoted
by ωigξ , satisfy
(i) ∃W ∈ R++ : ∀i ∈ I , ∀ξ ∈ D, ∑g∈G ωigξ ≤ W .
(ii) ωξ0 	 0 and, for ξ > ξ0 and any g, ωgξ > 0 whenever the g−th row of Yξ is
null.
Let Yξ0,ξn = Y (ξn)Y (ξn−1) . . . Y (ξ1) for ξk+1 ∈ ξk+. The aggregate phys-
ical resources available at node ξ are given by ξ = ∑i W iξ , where W iξ =∑
η∈{ξ0,...,ξ−,ξ} Yη,ξ ω
i
η.
We say that good g is perishable at node ξ if the g-th column of Yη is null for any
η ∈ ξ+.
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Assumption [U]. ∀i ∈ I , preferences over consumption are described by a time
and state separable utility Ui with instantaneous utility viξ : RG+ −→ R+ such that
(i) viξ is monotone and concave,
(ii) viξ is differentiable on RG++,
(iii) ∀α ∈ RG+ we have
∑
ξ∈D viξ (α) < ∞ and
(iv) ∑ξ∈D viξ (ξ ) < ∞.1
Consumers take as given prices p for goods, prices q for promises and delivery
rates K on the promises. As in Dubey et al. (2005), these delivery rates are impersonal
expectations about the ex post repayment of the promise. In equilibrium, 1 − K jξ is
the default rate on promise j in node ξ by the aggregate sellers of that promise [as
will be required in item (v) of Definition 1].
A choice variable is a nonnegative plan (x, θ, ϕ, ψ) consisting of purchases of
goods not for collateral purposes, promises purchases, promises sales and defaults,
respectively. We denote x˜ iξ = xiξ + Cξ ϕiξ . Budget constraints at the initial node or at
subsequent nodes ξ ∈ D\{ξ0}, are given, respectively, by:
pξ0(x˜
i
ξ0 − ωiξ0) + qξ0(θ iξ0 − ϕiξ0
) ≤ 0, (1)
pξ
(
x˜ξ − ωiξ − Yξ x˜ iξ− −
∑
j∈J (ξ−)
A jξ (K jξ θ ijξ− − ϕijξ−)
)
+ qξ (θ iξ − ϕiξ ) ≤
∑
j∈J (ξ−)
ψ ijξ , (2)
To shorten the notations, we define M jξ = min{pξ A jξ , pξ YξC jξ−}, for each node ξ
and for each promise j ∈ Jξ− . The minimal repayment constraint requires consumers
to repay at least M jξϕijξ− , that is,
ψ ijξ ≤ (pξ A jξ − M jξ )ϕijξ− (3)
The right-hand side of inequality (3) is the maximal default and the one that would be
given under non-recourse. Utility penalties may discourage consumers from defaulting
that maximal value.
Utility penalties are assumed to be linear on default. The marginal penalty on
nominal default in promise j is specified at each node ξ by λijξ . The marginal penalty
on real default in promise j at node ξ is given by λ˜ijξ =
λijξ
pξ eξ , where eξ ∈ RG++ is a
reference bundle. The entire payoff of consumer i is
i (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ; p, q, K ) :=
∑
ξ∈D
viξ (x˜
i
ξ ) −
∑
ξ∈D\{ξ0}
∑
j∈J (ξ−)
λ˜ijξ [ψ ijξ ]+
1 When Y is diagonal with elements uniformly bounded away from one, the assumptions that endowments
are uniformly bounded and that the utility of a bounded plan is finite are sufficient to ensure
∑
ξ∈D viξ (ξ ) <
∞ (see Páscoa and Seghir 2009).
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where [a]+ = max{a, 0}, for any a ∈ IR. Observe that, by the way the penalty
is written, there is no need to impose a nonnegativity constraint on ψ . Consumer
i problem consists in maximizing i subject to (1), (2) and (3) and the following
nonnegativity constraint
xi , θ i , ϕi ≥ 0 (4)
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a process (p, q, K , (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i )i∈I ) such that pξ >
02 at any node ξ ∈ D and verifying:
(i) ∀i ∈ I , (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) ∈ argmax i (x, θ, ϕ, ψ; p, q, K ) subject to (1), (2),
(3) and (4).
(ii) ∑i∈I [xi (ξ0) + C(ξ0)ϕi (ξ0)] =
∑
i∈I ωi (ξ0),
(iii) ∑i∈I [xiξ + Cξ ϕiξ ] =
∑
i∈I [ωiξ + Yξ xi (ξ−) + YξC(ξ−)ϕi (ξ−)], ∀ξ ∈ D\{ξ0},
(iv) ∑i∈I θ i =
∑
i∈I ϕi ,
(v) ∀ j, ξ ∈ D\{ξ0}, pξ A jξ (1 − K jξ )
∑
i∈I θ ij (ξ−) =
∑
i∈I ψ ijξ .
3 Infinite horizon individual optimality
3.1 Necessary conditions: Euler and transversality conditions
If agent i were optimizing over a finite horizon H , a plan (ψ i Hjξ , ϕ
i H
jξ , θ
i H
jξ , x
i H
gξ ) that
satisfies (1), (2) and (3) is optimal if and only if it satisfies the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
for some nonnegative multipliers together with some dijη ∈ [0, 1] supergradient of the
function max{0, ·} evaluated at ψ ijξ . These conditions induce the analogous Euler
conditions for the infinite horizon problem, as we report next.
Definition 2 Given prices (p, q, K ) and a plan Zi := (xi , θ i , φi , ψ i ) that verifies at
these prices the constraints (1), (2), (3) and (4), we say that Zi satisfies the Euler
conditions at (p, q, K ) if there exist supergradients (dij ) j∈J of the function max{0, ·}
evaluated at ψ ijξ and a nonnegative process (γ i , (ρ
i
j , ) j∈J ) of multipliers such that,
for any promise j ∈ J and any node ξ , the following hold
(i)
λ˜ijξ d
i
jξ + ρijξ = γ iξ (5)
γ iξ
(
pξC jξ − q jξ
) − viξ ′(x˜ξ )C jξ ≥
∑
η∈ξ+
[
γ iη
(
pηYηC jξ − M jη
)
− λ˜ijηdijη
(
pη A jη − M jη
)]
(6)
γ iξ q
j
ξ ≥
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη K jη pη A jη (7)
2 The reason why we require pξ > 0 to be an equilibrium condition has to do with the fact that the default
penalty coefficient λ˜ijξ ≡
λijξ
pξ eξ is only well defined in this case.
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∀g ∈ G, γ iξ pgξ ≥ vi ′ξ (x˜ξ , g) +
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη pη(Yη)
g, (8)
(ii) equalities in (6), (7) or (8) hold when ϕ jξ > 0, θ jξ > 0 or xgξ > 0, respectively.
(iii) ρijξ [ψ ijξ − (pξ A jξ − M jξ )ϕijξ−] = 0
As in any infinite horizon problem, Euler conditions are not the only necessary
conditions for infinite horizon optimality, a transversality condition must also hold.
For the problem described in Sect. 2, we say that a plan (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) satisfies the
transversality condition at (p, q, K ) when for viξ
′
evaluated at x˜ i we have
lim inf
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
(
viξ
′
x˜ iξ − γ iξ [pξ x˜ iξ + qξ (θ iξ − ϕiξ )]
) ≥ 0 (9)
Proposition Under assumption [U], if the plan (xi , θ i , φi , ψ i ) is a maximizer of
i (x, θ, ϕ, ψ) subject to (1), (2), (3) and (4) at prices (p, q, K ), then this plan satisfies
the Euler conditions and the transversality condition (9) at (p, q, K ).
Remark 1 (a) Actually, under (5), (7) and (8), we have that (9) implies the following
transversality condition specifically on borrowing,
lim inf
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
[viξ ′Cξ − γ iξ (pξCξ − qξ )]ϕiξ ≥ 0 (10)
(b) The converse, (10) implying (9), might not hold.3 See Appendix 6.1.
Remark 2 Notice that any sequence of equilibria (pH , q H , K H , (xi H , θ i H , ϕi H ,
ψ i H )i∈I ) of economies with increasing finite horizon H has a cluster point
(p, q, K , (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i )i∈I ) such that (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) satisfies Euler conditions and
transversality condition (9) at (p, q, K ), for each agent i (see Appendix 6.1 ).
3.2 A sufficient condition
However, Euler conditions together with the transversality condition (9) usually fail
to be sufficient in infinite horizon optimization problems. This is the case for the
optimization problem described in Sect. 2, as we will illustrate in the next section. A
sufficient condition can be provided by adding to Euler conditions and transversality
condition (9) the requirement that all budget-feasible plans should satisfy the converse
to condition (10). More precisely,
Theorem 1 (Sufficient condition for optimality) Let (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) be a plan for con-
sumer i that satisfies at (p, q, K ) constraints (1), (2), (3) and (4), together with Euler
conditions and the transversality condition (9). Suppose that any promises sales tra-
jectory ϕˆ which is part of a plan (xˆ, θˆ , ϕˆ, ψˆ) satisfying constraints (1), (2), (3) and
3 It does if θ i = 0 and i does not consume any durable good in excess of the collateral bundle.
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(4) at (p, q, K ) is such that for viξ
′
evaluated at xiξ + Cξ ϕiξ , we have
lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
[viξ ′Cξ − γ iξ (pξCξ − qξ )]ϕˆξ ≤ 0, (11)
then, under assumptions [U], [E] and [R], the plan (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) is optimal for i at
(p, q, K ).
To put it in another way, as the horizon truncation goes to infinity, equilibria of
finite-horizon economies have a cluster point which is actually an equilibrium for the
infinite-horizon economy if (11) holds for any budget-feasible plan.
In the next section, we give some intuition on the role of condition (11) and provide
an example where it does not hold and a plan satisfying Euler and transversality fails to
be individually optimal. It is also an example where a limit of finite horizon equilibria
is not an infinite horizon equilibrium.
3.3 Generalized Ponzi schemes
In the absence of utility penalties, one period non-arbitrage implies that, at each node ξ
and for each promise jξ , collateral costs pξC jξξ cannot be lower than the promise price
q jξ ; this inequality rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees existence of equilibrium
for the infinite horizon economy (see Araujo et al. 2002). When utility penalties are
introduced, this inequality does not follow anymore from non-arbitrage and Ponzi
schemes may reappear (see Páscoa and Seghir 2009). Furthermore, as we show now,
even if penalties were low enough so that Ponzi schemes could be avoided (as will
be the case in Sect. 4.1), there might not exist optimal solutions to the consumers’
problems.
Let us be more precise. A Ponzi scheme consists in increasing the sale position
in promise j at node ξ and then accommodate this by increasing the sale position
in another promise at the following nodes. As shown in Páscoa and Seghir (2009),
Section 4.1, a Ponzi scheme exists when there is a node ξ˜ such that at all nodes ξ in
the sub-tree starting at ξ˜ we have pξC
jξ
ξ − q jξξ < 0, for some promise jξ .
There may exist nevertheless an extended form of Ponzi schemes, compatible with
pξC
jξ
ξ − q jξξ ≥ 0 holding for any promise j and at any node ξ . This consists in
increasing the sale position in some promise jξ at nodes ξ where the marginal utility of
collateral consumption outweighs the disutility resulting from the haircut pξC
jξ
ξ −q jξξ .
For such change to be budget-feasible, that cost has to be compensated by the reduction
in another expenditure, say a decrease in consumption of a perishable good. Now, the
utility impact at nodes that immediately follow ξ cancels out the utility gain that
occurred at ξ , provided the consumer was already shorting the promise jξ (so that the
Euler condition on shorting holds as an equality). For this reason, the increase in a
sale position in a promise at a certain node does not need to be related to what was the
increase in a previous node; it just needs to be affordable by how much the perishable
consumption may be cut.
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However, for any finite horizon truncation T of such process, we are left with the
gain that may occur at date T . In the open end setting, letting T → ∞, there may be
a persistent gain (analogous to the limiting gains occurring in Ponzi schemes done in
the case of unsecured unbounded promises or in the case of secured recourse promises
with a negative haircut).
By definition, the improvement consisting in a generalized Ponzi scheme is done
in spite of the absence of finite horizon arbitrage opportunities (ruled out by Euler
conditions) and, therefore, the set of nodes where short positions are being increased
must be an infinite set. When a generalized Ponzi scheme can be done upon a cluster
point of finite horizon equilibria, the latter is not an infinite horizon equilibrium. Let
us give an example.
Example 1 Two consumers, a and b, trade one promise in a deterministic setting. The
promise pays in a perishable good, fruit, and is secured by a productive asset, fruit tree.
The former is the numeraire and also the reference good in the real default penalty. We
assume that consumer a just cares about fruit, with linear preferences, while consumer
b has quasi-linear preferences, linear in fruit and strictly concave in the shade provided
by the fruit tree.
Formally, U a(x) = ∑∞t=1 β ta x1t and U b(x) =
∑∞
t=1 β tb(x1t +nt (x2t )), where nt (.)
is a strictly concave function to be specified below. The utility that agent b gets at time
t from the shade is vt (x2t ) = β tbnt (x2t ). We have γ at = β ta when xa1t > 0 and, for
xbt >> 0, we have also γ bt = β tb. We construct finite horizon equilibria where both
agents consume fruit at every date in spite of the linearity of preferences in fruit.
Fruit trees just last from one date to the next. Trees take one period to yield fruit,
at a rate y < 1 that is constant over time, and then die. The transformation matrix Y
has a first row given by [0y] and a null second row. At each date, new fruit trees are
born in the orchards of each consumer, in the amounts ωi2t . We assume that, for both
consumers, the sequence (ωi2t )t converges and ω
i
2 ≫ 0. The aggregate supply of fruit
at date t is given by (ωa2,t−1 + ωb2,t−1)y. Let pt and qt be the tree and the promise
prices, at date t .
We assume βa > βb and that the default penalty coefficient of agent b is λbt = β tbσt
where σt is lower than one. Now, λ˜bt = λbt < γ bt , so that this agent would always give
maximal default when selling the promise. We suppose each unit of a promise traded
at date t has a fruit yield At+1 = ηyCt , with η > 1, so that the minimal delivery of
the promise becomes Mt+1 = yCt . Let Kt+1 = yCt/At+1 = 1/η.
We set the promise price equal to the willingness to pay of agent 1, qt = β1 yCt ,
and also to the reservation price of agent b as a seller of the promise, qt = pt Ct −
n′t Ct +βbσt+1dt+1(At+1−yCt ), where dt+1 ∈ [0, 1] is a supergradient of the function
max{0, ·} evaluated at the default. If the promise is actually traded, agent a will buy it
and agent b will sell it. The price of a tree must satisfy pt ≥ βa y and pt ≥ βb y+n′t (xb2t ),
holding with equalities if the collateral constraint (xi2t ≥ Ctϕit ) has null shadow value
for the respective agent. Let us look for an equilibrium where the promise is traded, and
these shadow values are positive for agent a and null for agent b. This is compatible with
xa2 and ϕa both zero, while agent b could be consuming trees in excess of the collateral
requirement but actually will not, as we will see. Then, βa y < pt = βb y + n′t (xb2t ).
This implies pt Ct − qt = [n′t − (βa − βb)y]Ct > 0.
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Market clearing requires θat = ϕbt , Ctϕbt = ωa2t + ωb2t and xa1t + xb1t = (ωa2,t−1 +
ωb2,t−1)y. The promise short position is then given by ϕbt = (ωa2t + ωb2t )/Ct .
Our specification of Ct and nt will allow for agent b to construct a generalized
Ponzi scheme upon the limit (p, q, K , θ, ϕ, x) of finite horizon equilibrium plans.
Let agent b increase the sale of the promise by αt at each date and give maximal
default on αt at the next date. The extra expenditure (pt Ct − qt )αt is accommodated
in the budget set by decreasing the consumption of the numeraire.
Claim 1(i): Suppose xb1 ≫ 0. For s ∈ (0, 1), let αt = sxb1t/(pt Ct − qt ). For s close
enough to 0, consumer b can improve upon (xb1 , ϕb) provided that α is a bounded
sequence satisfying the following condition
lim sup
T
[v′T CT − γ bT (pT CT − qT )]αT > 0 (12)
In fact, for xb1 ≫ 0 there exists s˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any sˆ ∈ (0, s˜) and
α(sˆ)t ≡ sˆxb1t/(pt Ct − qt ) the plan resulting from increasing sales by α(sˆ), giving
maximal default on α(sˆ) and reducing consumption of good 1 to (1 − sˆ)xb1 is budget
feasible. Let us evaluate the impact on the payoff.
The net utility gain at date t has a first-order approximation given by [v′t Ct −
γ bt (pt Ct − qt )]α(sˆ)t ≡ Bt , where v′t is evaluated at Ctϕbt . Now, since agent b has
the Euler condition on sales holding with equality, this gain will cancel out with the
utility impact (including penalty impact) that such date t changes will have on date
t + 1 utility, [γ bt+1(yCt − Mt ) − λ˜bt dt (At+1 − Mt+1)]α(sˆ)t ≡ B˜t+1.
Then, up to date T the accumulated utility gain has a first-order approximation
given by BT . As T → ∞, the first-order estimate of the utility gain remains positive
if lim supT [v′T CT − γ bT (pT CT − qT )]α(sˆ)T > 0.
To be more precise, consider the direction αZ (sˆ) consisting, at each date t , of a
change in x1t given by αx1(sˆ)t = −sˆxb1t , a change in sales given by α(sˆ)t , a change
in default αψ(sˆ)t = (η − 1)yCtα(sˆ)t and null changes αθ (sˆ)t and αx2(sˆ)t in θt and
x2t , respectively. The above estimate of the utility gain is actually the right-hand side
directional derivative δ+b(Zb;αZ (sˆ)) of  at Zb along the direction αZ (sˆ) if αZ (sˆ)
is a bounded sequence.4 Agent b can improve upon if δ+b(Zb;αZ (sˆ)) > 0.
For a small enough step h > 0, consumer b becomes better off when replacing ϕb
by ϕb + hα(sˆ), giving maximal default on hα(sˆ) and reducing xb1 to (1 − sˆ)xb1 . Let
s = hsˆ we get the result. unionsq
Claim 1(ii): α is a bounded sequence if Ct = 1/β tb and the function nt is defined by
nt (x2t ) = (βa − βb)yx2t + β tb
√
x2t (that is, the instantaneous utility from fruit trees
is becoming less strictly concave as times goes by).
In fact, α is bounded if (pt Ct − qt )t ≫ 0, that is, if ((n′t − (βa −βb)y)Ct )t ≫ 0.
Now, pt Ct − qt = β tbCt/[2
√
ωa2t + ωb2t ], where ωi2 are bounded sequences. unionsq
4 Ub , being (l∞, l1) Mackey continuous, has at (xb1 , Cϕb) ≫ 0 a Gateaux derivative in l1 (see Lemma 1
in Araujo et al. 2011a) and  has a Gateaux derivative Db(Zb) ∈ l1 at Zb . If α(sˆ) ∈ l∞, then αZ (sˆ) ∈ l∞
also and we have δ+b(Zb;αZ (sˆ)) ≡ limh→0+[b(Zb + hαZ (sˆ)) − b(Zb]/h exists and is equal to
Db(Zb)αZ (sˆ) =
∑∞
t=1(Bt + B˜t+1) = limT [v′T CT − γ bT (pT CT − qT )]α(sˆ)T .
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Claim 1(iii): inequality (12) holds, for xb1 ≫ 0 and under the assumptions in 1.(ii)
(where the limsup is actually the limit, due to 1(ii)).
This requires lim
t→∞
sxb1t (βa−βb)yβ tb
n′t−(βa−βb)y > 0, that is, limt→∞ sx
b
1t (βa − βb)2y
√
ωa2t + ωb2t >
0, which holds if ωi2 ≫ 0 for i = a, b and xb1 ≫ 0. unionsq
Claim 1(iv): xb1 ≫ 0, under the assumptions in 1.(ii).
In fact, xb1t = ptωb2t − (pt Ct − qt )ϕbt where pt tends to βa y, while ϕt goes to zero
and pt Ct − qt = 1/[2
√
ωa2t + ωb2t ], where ωi2t ≫ 0. unionsq
Actually, the example illustrates more than a failure of cluster points of finite horizon
equilibria to become infinite horizon equilibria. It illustrates that a budget-feasible plan
satisfying Euler and transversality conditions may fail to be individually optimal.
In fact, in Example 1, the portfolio ϕb + α together with the perishable good
consumption xb1 (1− s) satisfy budget constraints and Euler conditions at prices (p, q)
and Kt = 1/η. Notice that ϕb satisfies also the transversality condition lim
t→∞[v
′
t Ct −
γ bt (pt Ct − qt )]ϕbt = 0, since v′t Ct − γ bt (pt Ct − qt ) = (βa − βb)y and limt→∞ ϕ
b
t = 0.
Now, (11) fails for ϕˆ = ϕb + α.
Examples 1 and 2 in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) illustrated why finite horizon equi-
libria may fail to induce infinite horizon equilibria for another reason. Utility penalties
were high enough to discourage maximal default (there is no default in the former and
default below the maximal one in the latter). An equality in (6) for the short, made the
haircut pt Ct − qt become negative in finite horizon equilibria with trade (as shown
in steps I and A of those examples, respectively). That allowed for a Ponzi scheme
upon a cluster of finite horizon equilibria with trade. The novelty in the example we
just described is that a negative haircut is not necessary to allow the short to improve
upon such cluster point.
If utility penalties were absent, generalized Ponzi schemes could never be done.
Constituting collateral and short-selling generates in this case nonnegative returns
(∑η∈ξ+ γ iη
(
pηYηC jη − M jη
)
) which, by non-arbitrage [see (6)], must induce a non-
negative promise cost γ iξ
(
pξC
jξ
ξ − q jξξ
) − viξ ′C jξξ (net of utility gains).
In Sect. 4, we present existence results in contexts where (11) holds.
4 Existence results
4.1 Moderate penalties
Let r iξ (eξ ) be the minimum of the derivative (v
i
ξ )
′(z)eξ , of viξ along the direction of
the reference bundle eξ (used in the definition of penalties), taken over all feasible
bundles z. This minimum is well defined, by Lemma 3 in Appendix 6.2.
Theorem 2 (Moderate penalties) Under assumptions [R], [E] and [U], if for every
promise j ∈ J we have (a) λijξ < r iξ , then pξCξ ≥ qξ in equilibrium of finite-
horizon economies and Ponzi schemes, in stricto sensu, are avoided. Equilibrium for
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the infinite-horizon economy exists if, in addition, (b) the collateral does not yield
utility (say, it is a productive asset or a security in positive net supply that cannot be
short sold).
Our moderate penalties assumption is in marginal terms (compares penalty coef-
ficients and marginal utilities), whereas the moderation assumption contemplated
in Páscoa and Seghir (2009) was in total terms: for each node ξ and each agent
i , it assumed (1) λ˜ijη[pη A jη − M jη]ϕijξ < viη(ωiη), ∀η ∈ ξ+, whenever (2)
C jξ ϕ
i
jξ ≤
∑
i W iξ . That total terms condition only suffices to get existence of equilib-
rium in infinite-horizon economies, if promises sales plans are required to satisfy (2) as
a borrowing constraint (alternatively, (1) alone should be imposed). In fact, condition
(11) holds in this case since lim supT
∑
ξ : tξ=T
(
viξ
′
(Zi )Cξ − γ iξ (pξCξ − qξ )
)
ϕξ <
lim supT
∑
ξ : tξ=T v
i (ωi ), which is zero since Ui (ωi ) < ∞.
4.2 Equilibriumwithout maximal default
However, the above low penalties, implying maximal default when the promises are
traded, are not necessary for equilibrium existence. Partial default or even full repay-
ment are compatible with equilibrium and may occur under higher penalty coefficients.
In fact, generalized Ponzi schemes are obviously avoided when, for all i and all j , we
have γ iξ (pξC jξ − q jξ ) − viξ ′ · C jξ ≥ 0, ∀i , at all nodes far away in the event tree [as
this implies inequality (11) in Theorem 1]. By (6) it suffices to have, for all i , all ξ
and all j , the following
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη(pηYηC jξ − M jη) −
∑
η∈ξ+
λ˜ijηd
i
jη(pη A jη − M jη) ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀ξ, (13)
where dijη satisfies (5). We can state condition (5) in a more suggestive way. In market
parlance, the consumer’s home equity is the difference between the collateral liquida-
tion value and the repayment due on the loan. Let E Q jη := pηYηC jξ − pη A jη. Home
equity is linear on ϕij with an impersonal coefficient E Q jη that determines what the
sign of home equity will be. We name E Q jη the equity per unit of promise j at node
η.
Condition (13) can be equivalently written as follows
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη[E Q jξ ]+ ≥
∑
η∈ξ+
λ˜ijηd
i
jη[E Q jξ ]− (14)
which says that, for each promise j and summing over all immediate successors of
node ξ , the marginal utility gains from positive per unit equity should outweigh default
penalties on negative per unit equity. In the non-recourse case, the former occurred
exclusively and were responsible for pξC jξ never being below than q jξ , which ruled
out Ponzi schemes.
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Moreover, by (5), we see that (13) holds if (but not only if)
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη E Q jξ ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀ξ (15)
is satisfied for all i and for all ξ. Moreover, when the collateral does not yield utility
gains, it is enough to have the inequality in (13) [or in (15)] satisfied, at each node ξ ,
for some agent iξ , as this implies pξC jξ ≥ q jξ .
The difficulty is that condition (15) depends on relative spot prices pη and on the
marginal utilities of income γ iη , and, in general, it is not possible to guarantee that
the market clearing spot prices (and the induced multiplier γ i ) are such that (15) is
satisfied, for an arbitrary combination of returns (A j ) and collateral yields Y C j . Let
us give, nevertheless, an example where (15) holds for arbitrary penalty coefficients.
This example will motivate our next result.
Example 2 (partial default or full repayment)
There are two infinite-lived agents, a and b. The event tree has two branches at each
node ξ (up (uξ ) and down (dξ )). There is one consumption good, and preferences are
given by Ui (x) = ∑ξ∈D β tξ νiξ xξ , where νiuξ + νidξ = νiξ ,
∑
ξ : tξ=t ν
i
ξ = 1, ∀t .
There is one promise paying in the consumption good and using as collateral a real
security (or a productive asset) that is short-lived but is issued (or endowed) at each
node. Formally, this collateral instrument can be treated as a second commodity that
transforms into the consumption good at the next date and then disappears. Denote by
Aξ the promised returns and by yξ the collateral yields. The collateral coefficient is
Cξ = 1, and we take the perishable consumption good (g = 1) as the numeraire.
Let the reference bundle in the penalty function be eξ = (1, 0). Each agent i
has a penalty coefficient σ iξ to be specified below. The penalty is then given by∑
ξ∈D β tξ σ iξ νξ [Aξ ϕξ− − ξ ]+, where ξ stands for the delivery (ξ = Aξ ϕξ− −
ψξ ).
Given endowments ωiξ =
(
ωi1ξ , ω
i
2ξ
)
of the consumption good and the collateral
instrument, we write consumers’ constraints as usual, denoting by pξ the collateral
price and by qξ the promise price. Suppose νauξ = νadξ = 12
tξ+1
, whereas νbuξ = 23νbξ
and νbdξ = 13νbξ . We will construct equilibria where both agents consume the perishable
good at every node, which implies that γ iξ = β t(ξ)νiξ
Claim 2(i): If Auξ = 2, Adξ = 1, yuξ = 1 and ydξ = 2, ∀ξ , then a cluster point of
finite horizon equilibria is an infinite horizon equilibrium.
In fact, the equity at each node is such that (15) holds with equality for agent a (and
therefore (13) holds with equality for this agent, for any penalty coefficients σ aξ ). As
the collateral does not yield utility, (11) holds for both agents. unionsq
Let us look for equilibrium prices and delivery rates for some possible configu-
rations of default penalties of the two agents. For agent b, we assume σ bξ ≥ 1 (i.e.,
λbξ ≥ γ bξ , ∀ξ ) and, for both agents, we take ρiξ = 0, implying that (5) holds for
diξ = 1σ iξ . Observe that if β ≤ 2/3 then (8) holds, for both agents.
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Suppose first that σ aξ = 1 (i.e., λaξ = γ aξ ) ∀ξ . Then Kuξ = 0.9, pξ = qξ = 4.63 β
and Kdξ = 1 satisfy Euler conditions (5) through (7), with agent a on-the-verge of
selling and agent b on-the-verge of buying.
If σ aξ > 1 instead (i.e., λaξ > γ aξ ) ∀ξ , we see that Kuξ = Kdξ = 1 and pξ = qξ =
5
3 β satisfy Euler conditions (5) through (8), with agent a on-the-verge of selling and
agent b on-the-verge of buying.
It remains to specify agents’ endowments and construct the equilibrium allocation
of consumption plans and portfolios. Taking ωaξ = (1, 0) and ωbξ = (1, w), ∀ξ , let
θbξ = w, ϕaξ = w, θ iξ ϕiξ = 0 and xi2 ξ = 0 (no purchase of commodity 2 beyond what
might be used as collateral).
Claim 2(ii): if w < 1, we can accommodate both σ aξ = 1 and σ aξ > 1 in equilibrium.
In the first case, where σ aξ = 1, we obtain auξ = 0.9Auξ w = 1.8w, adξ =
Adξ w = w. Take xi1ξ = ωi1ξ + YξCξ−ϕiξ− − iξ + Kξ Aξ θ iξ− . Then, xa1 uξ = 1 −
0.8w, xa1 dξ = 1 + w, xb1 uξ = 1 + 1.8w, xb1 dξ = 1 + w. Market clearing follows
(
∑
i x
i
1ξ =
∑
i ω
i
1ξ + yξ w) and we assume w < 1.25 to obtain an equilibrium.
In the second case, where σ aξ > 1, ∀ξ (that is λaξ = γ aξ ∀ξ ), the equilibrium
allocation is given by the same promise allocation, auξ = 2w, adξ = w, xa1 uξ =
1 − w, xa1 dξ = 1 + w, xb1 uξ = 1 + 2w, xb1 dξ = 1 + w. 
Remark 3 on the result by Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010) on impossibility of
recourse.
Example 2 shows that recourse can actually occur in infinite horizon equilibria.
The borrower (agent a) repays more than the minimum between the promise and the
collateral value. But recourse does not open up room for Ponzi schemes: the haircut
does not become negative, it is just zero.
This seems to collide with the claim by Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010) that
recourse is impossible in infinite horizon equilibria but a closer look shows that their
assumption on collateral bounds is not satisfied.
As in Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010), we write K jξ = M jξ + Q jξ (pξ A jξ −
YξC jξ−)+, where Q jξ ∈ [0, 1] measures the repayment above the minimal one (that
is, the degree of recourse). Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010) showed that the haircut
pξC jξ −q jξ becomes negative if ∑g C jgξ <<
∑
η∈ξ+ Q jξπη A jη/πη ≡ ξ , where
π gξ and πξ are lower and upper (over all goods) bounds, respectively, for γ iξ pgξ .
In Example 2, there is just one promise and two cases. In case 1 (for σ a = 1), we
have Quξ = 0.8 while Qdξ takes any value in [0, 1]. In case 2 (when σ a > 1), we
have Quξ = 1 while Qdξ takes any value in [0, 1]. We actually know what γ iξ pgξ is.
For the numeraire (the perishable good), it is β t(ξ)νiξ while for the commodity that
serves as collateral it is β t(ξ)νiξ pξ . Let 
i
ξ ≡
∑
η∈ξ+ Q jξ γ iη Aη/γ iξ pξ ≥ ξ . Even for
Qdξ = 1, we see that in case 1, bξ = 4.2/4.6 while in case 2, bξ = 1. As C = 1, it
follows that the condition in Ferreira and Torres-Martinez (2010) is not satisfied. The
haircut is actually zero and Ponzi schemes cannot be done (neither can generalized
ones as the collateral does not yield any utility).
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4.3 Nominal contracts
The above example where both the promise and the collateral are numeraire assets
could be redone with both being nominal assets (say, the promise is a loan, with
exogenous yields, whose purpose is the purchase of a bond). This leads us to study
what happens when this promise or the collateral are nominal assets. In both cases,
collateralized borrowing is not inflation proof.
Formally, we replace assumption [R] by
Assumption [N].
We allow for nominal promises or nominal collateral. A promise j not satisfying
items (i) and (ii) of [R] is such that
(i) its returns are nominal given by F jη ∈ R+ at η ∈ ξ+, for j ∈ J .
(ii) its collateral may be real as in [R (ii)] or nominal. In the latter, the collateral
requirement at η ∈ ξ+ is c jη ∈ R++ and the collateral has an exogenous
nominal return y˜ jη ∈ R++ at any node η ∈ ξ+.
As usual, given a promise with nominal returns F jξ , we let A jξ = F
j
ξ
Sξ I1 where Sξ
stands for ‖pξ‖1 and I1 = (1, . . . , 1). Analogously, in the case of nominal collateral,
we make C jξ = y˜
j
ξ
Sξ I1. Equilibrium is still given by Definition 1.
Recall that for unsecured nominal assets, we had a homogeneity of commodity
demand with respect to (Sη)η∈ξ+ : if we multiply Sη by τ > 0, ∀η ∈ ξ+, and adjust
the portfolio (multiplying by τ ) and asset prices (dividing by τ ), we can maintain the
original bundle at the same relative spot prices. However, that homogeneity does not
hold for promises secured by exogenous collateral requirements.
The indeterminacy with respect to inflation rates,5 at finite horizon equilibria
with nominal promises or nominal collateral, may allow us to pick an equilibrium
where marginal penalty effects
(
λ˜ijηd
i
jη[E Q jη]−
)
may become dominated by marginal
income effects
(
γ iη[E Q jη]+
)
. If that is the case, (13) holds (and, therefore, (11) holds
at the cluster point).6
Theorem 3 Let J  be the set of promises for which assumptions (a) or (b) of Theorem 2
fail. Under assumptions [E] and [U], equilibrium exists, if every j ∈ J ∗ is a nominal
promise backed by real collateral, as in [N].
For a nominal promise j backed by real collateral, (13) holds if:
∑
η∈ξ+
S−1η max{λijη, γ iη} F jη ≤
∑
η∈ξ+
min{λijη, γ iη} pηYηC jη , ∀i, ∀ξ (16)
5 We are not interested in checking whether the degree of freedom in the choice of inflation rates implies
real indeterminacy of equilibria.
6 Given a nominal promise F jξ , the condition that ruled out recourse in Ferreira and Torres-Martinez
(2010) will not hold for the real returns analog A jξ =
F j
ξ
Sξ I1, for an appropriate choice of inflation rates
Sξ = ‖pξ ‖1.
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Theorem 3 allows for direct utility gains from collateral in the case of nominal
promises backed by real collateral, by showing that (16) holds for every agent. If
the inequality in (16) held for just one agent and there were no utility gains from
collateral, then the condition in Theorem 1 would still be verified and there would
exist an equilibrium for the infinite horizon economy. The next example illustrates
this case, actually in an economy where the nominal promise/real collateral contract
coexists with a nominal promise/nominal collateral contract with endogenous margins.
For a nominal promise backed by a nominal collateral, (13) holds if:
∑
η∈ξ+
S−1η max{λijη, γ iη} F jη ≤
∑
η∈ξ+
S−1η min{λijη, γ iη} y˜ jη C jξ , ∀i, ∀ξ (17)
Example 3 For the economy of Example 2 take agent a and the pair of contracts: one
nominal-real with F1uξ = 1, F1dξ = 2 and Yuξ = (1, 0), Ydξ = (1, 0), C1 = (0, 1)
and another nominal-nominal with F2uξ = 1, F2dξ = 3 and y˜uξ = y˜dξ = 1, c2 to be
determined. For λajη = β tη ( 12 )
tη
σ
a j
η , let σ a juξ = 2 and σ a jη = 1 otherwise ( j = 1, 2).
Claim 3(i): conditions (16) and (17) hold (for j = 1 and j = 2, respectively), with
an exogenous collateral requirement for j = 1 and endogenous ones for j = 2.
These conditions are:
2S−1uξ F
1
uξ
+ S−1dξ F1dξ ≤ Yuξ + Ydξ ,
2S−1uξ F
2
uξ
+ S−1dξ F2dξ ≤ (S−1uξ y˜uξ + S−1dξ y˜dξ ) c2.
Holding as equalities for S−1uξ = S−1dξ = 0.5 and c2 = 2.5, implying that at uξ , both
promises are above collateral values (with opportunity for default, which will not be
used as λajuξ > γ auξ ) while at dξ the first promise matches the collateral values whereas
the second one falls below it. unionsq
5 Concluding remarks
Non-recourse loans have the beauty of eliminating Ponzi schemes and, therefore,
the infinite-horizon economy has an equilibrium under the same costless assumptions
that made the finite-horizon economy avoid the well-known Hart’s problem. There are,
however, many credit contracts that are recourse and arguments that may explain why
for some particular contracts recourse is more appealing, but we should ask ourselves
why do they hold on in an open end framework. Our paper addresses this question.
Apart from the cases of mortgages in Europe and in most (37) of the US states, there
are other examples of recourse collateralized loans. The most important are the security
financing transactions (SFT), which take either the form of repo or security lending.
In the former, a security serves as collateral for a cash loan (possibly for the purchase
of the security itself), whereas in the latter a security is being lent against a collateral
that can be either cash or another security. In both types of SFT, failure to redeliver the
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lent object constitutes an event of default and triggers bankruptcy. More precisely, the
lender of cash in repo or the lender of the security who are both holding the collateral
can dispose of it (there is no automatic stay) and then the remaining value of the
loan (not covered by the current collateral value) will be claimed from the defaulter’s
liquidated estate. There was only a brief exception to this, when the Fed allowed repo
to be non-recourse in a short period in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
Our model is quite general and abstracts from institutional details that different
recourse loans may have.7 It is, however, a first step toward understanding why is
recourse borrowing compatible with open end equilibrium (where either successive
term loans become chained or an open end loan is present). We focus on the case
of recourse due to the presence of a utility penalty on default. This case tries to
capture non-explicit pecuniary, reputational or credit access penalties and is sometimes
regarded as an approximate proxy for more elaborate forms of recourse. Our results
show that while open end equilibrium does not exist in the same straightforward way as
it did in non-recourse, there are nevertheless interesting cases, relevant for observed
recourse contracts, where equilibrium exists, such as the case of moderate utility
penalties combined with non-consumed collateral (as in the above STFs or in loans for
the purchase of equipment) and the case of nominal promises backed by real collateral
(as in most mortgages, where payments are not indexed to commodity prices).
Moreover, in our work, recourse is not just an ex ante scenario. We illustrate (in
Example 2) how harsh utility penalties induce actual recourse (debts repayments above
the minimal repayment) while still allowing for nonnegative haircuts, as desired to
avoid Ponzi schemes, and equilibrium is shown to exist. We illustrate also (in Exam-
ple 1) why absence of such schemes is not enough to ensure infinite horizon equilibrium
when there are direct utility gains from the consumption of the collateral.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
6 Appendix
6.1 On Sect. 3
Proof of the Proposition:
For each node ξ , we define the Lagrangian function for agent i as:
Liξ (Zξ , Zξ− , γ, p, q, K ) = viξ (x˜ξ ) −
∑
j
λ˜ijξ [ψ ijξ ]+
−γξ
[
pξ (x˜ iξ − ωiξ − Yξ x˜ iξ−) + qξ (θ iξ − ϕiξ )
7 For finite horizon general equilibrium models that capture these institutional details, see Araujo and
Páscoa (2002) on recourse and unsecured loans and Poblete-Cazenave and Torres-Martinez (2013) on
limited recourse and secured loans.
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−
∑
j
ψ ijξ −
∑
j
pξ A jξ (K jξ θ ijξ− − ϕijξ−)
]
−
∑
j
ρ
j
ξ
[
ψ ijξ − (pξ A jξ − M jξ )ϕijξ−
]
.
For Liξ0 to be well defined, we set Zξ−0 = (0, 0, 0, 0).(1) The claim in Proposition 1 on Euler conditions is as in Páscoa and Seghir
(2009) and can be proven using the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of finite horizon truncated
problems and making the horizon go to infinity (as in Araujo et al. 2011b). In fact, for
each node, the sequence of Kuhn–Tucker multipliers has a cluster point, as the next
lemma establishes.
A finite horizon H truncated problem is defined by imposing on the optimization
problem described in Sect. 2 the additional constraints (θξ , ϕξ ) = 0 for t(ξ) ≥ H and
(xξ , ψξ ) = 0 for t(ξ) > H .
Let us start by recalling the saddle point property [see Rockafellar (1997), Theorem
38.3]. For any finite horizon H truncated problem, at an optimal plan (Zi H , p, q, K )
and for any nonnegative plan (Zξ )ξ∈DH we have
∑
ξ∈DH
Liξ (Zξ , Zξ− , γ
i H , p, q, K ) ≤ i (Zi H ; p, q, K ) (18)
By appropriately choosing the plan (Zξ )ξ∈DH , we get the following result.
Lemma 1 For each node ξ ∈ D and for any economy with finite horizon H ≥ tξ , one
has: 0 ≤ γ i Hξ < U
i ()
W iξ ‖pξ ‖1
.
Proof For t ≤ H , let Z = (Zξ )ξ∈DH be such that Zξ =
(
W iξ , 0, 0, 0
)
if ξ ∈ Dt−1
and Zξ = 0 otherwise. By (18) we get
∑
ξ∈Dt
Lξ i (Z
i H
ξ , Z
i H
ξ− , γ
i H
ξ , p, q, K ) ≤
∑
ξ∈DH
viξ (x˜
i H
ξ ). (19)
Hence,
∑
ξ∈Dt
γ i Hξ pξW iξ ≤
∑
ξ∈DH
viξ (x˜
i H
ξ ), where v
i
ξ (x˜
i H
ξ ) ≤ viξ (ξ ). unionsq
It follows from Lemma 1 that multipliers γ i Hξ have upper bounds γ
i
ξ that are
independent of the terminal horizon H of the economy, since W iξ > 0 by Assumption
[E]. Moreover, it follows from Eq. (5) that ρi Hξ also has an upper bound independent
of H . Letting H → ∞, we can find cluster points, for the product topology of the
countable event tree, of the sequences (γ i Hξ , ρ
i H
ξ , (Z
i H
ξ )i ). Denote these cluster points
by (γ iξ , ρ
i
ξ , (Z
i
ξ )i )). We still have γ
i
ξ <
Ui ()
W iξ ‖pξ ‖1
.
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Now, let the vectors Li1 ξ and L
i
2 ξ be partial supergradients of L
i
ξ (Z
i , γ i , p, q, K )
with respect to the current and past decision variables, respectively.
The proof that Euler conditions hold at an optimal plan for the infinite horizon
problem then follows as in Araujo et al. (2011b), proof of item (i) of Proposition 1.
We get the following relations,
Li1 ξ (Z
i
) +
∑
η∈ξ+
Li2 η(Z
i
) ≤ 0, (20)
(
Li1 ξ (Z
i
) +
∑
η∈ξ+
Li2 η(Z
i
)
)
Ziξ = 0. (21)
which are equivalent to the Euler conditions.
(2) The fulfillment of the transversality condition (9) follows from the saddle point
property:
Claim
∑
ξ : tξ=T
∑
η∈ξ+
Li2 η(Z
i
)Ziξ ≤
∑
ξ∈D\DT−1
viξ (Z
i
ξ ).
This claim can be established using (18) where for T ≤ H we let (Zξ )ξ∈DT be such
that Zξ = Zi Hξ χDT−1(ξ). Then
∑
ξ : tξ=T
∑
η∈ξ+ Li2 η(Z
i H
)Zi Hξ +
∑
ξ∈DH \DT−1 γ i Hξ
pξωiξ ≤
∑
ξ∈DH \DT−1(viξ (Z
i H
ξ ) − viξ (0)). We let H → ∞ and get the claimed
inequality. unionsq
The claim implies that
lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
∑
η∈ξ+
Li2 η(Z
i
)Ziξ ≤ 0. (22)
Claim (9) holds if and only if (22) holds.
In fact,
∑
η∈ξ+ Li2 η(Z
i
)Ziξ =−[Li1x ξ (Zi )xiξ+Li1θ ξ (Zi )θ iξ+Li1ϕ ξ (Zi )ϕiξ+Li1ψ ξ (Zi )ψ iξ ].
where Li1ψ ξ (ψ
i
)ψ
i
ξ = 0 by (5). Then, (22) is equivalent to (9). unionsq
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
On Remark 1:
Condition (10) holds if and only if lim inf
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
(
Li1ϕ ξ (Z
i
)ϕiξ
) ≥ 0.
(a) To see that (9) implies (10), let us show that
lim inf
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T (L
i
1ϕ ξ (Z
i
)ϕiξ ) ≥ lim infT
∑
ξ : tξ=T (L
i
1 ξ (Z
i
)Ziξ )
It is enough to show that lim inf
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T (L
i
1ϕ ξ (Z
i
)ϕiξ − Li1 ξ (Zi )Ziξ ) ≥ 0,
which by (5) is equivalent to lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
(
Li1x ξ (Z
i
)xiξ + Li1θ ξ (Zi )θ iξ
) ≤ 0.
The latter follows from Li1x ξ (Z
i
)xiξ and Li1θ ξ (Z
i
)θ
i
ξ being both non-positive [by
(21) since at η ∈ ξ+ we have Li2x η(Zi )xiξ ≥ 0 and Li2θ η(Zi )θ iξ ≥ 0].
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(b) Let us see that (10) implies (9) when θ i = 0 and consumer i does not consume
more of any durable good than the collateral bundle. These two assumptions imply
that Li1x ξ (Z
i
)xiξ = 0 and Li1θ ξ (Zi )θ iξ = 0. So, lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T (−Li1ϕ ξ (Z
i
)ϕiξ ) =
lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T L
i
1ϕ ξ (Z
i
)ϕiξ .
On Remark 2:
The existence of a cluster point follows from the fact that equilibrium allocations
Zi H ≡ (xi H , θ i H , ϕi H , ψ i H ) of finite horizon economies have upper bounds, uni-
formly on the horizon H (for portfolios this follows from the collateral requirements
and assumption [E]). Actually, equilibrium prices and the associated equilibrium mul-
tipliers also have uniform upper bounds: we normalize prices by placing (pξ , qξ ) in
the G + Jξ − 1 dimensional simplex and multipliers (γ iξ , ρ jξ ) have upper bounds that
are independent of prices and of the terminal horizon T , as established in Remark
A.1 in the Appendix. So, node by node, equilibrium variables (prices, delivery rates,
allocations, multipliers and the above supergradients) of all finite-horizon economies
have common upper bounds.
Then the sequence
(
pH , q H , K H , (Zi H , γ i H , ρi H , di H )i
)
of equilibrium prices,
allocations, multipliers and supergradients of the functions max{0, ·} verify the Kuhn–
Tucker conditions, for the truncated economies. This sequence has, node by node, a
cluster point
(
p, q, K , (Zi , γ i , ρi , di )i
)
satisfying Euler conditions. Observe that at
the price cluster point p, the payoff functions are well defined, as pξ > 0 at any node
ξ , by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 At each node, the sum of spot prices is bounded away from zero, uniformly in
the finite horizon H and, therefore, also bounded away from zero in the infinite-horizon
economy.
This follows from Lemma 3 as in part (b) of Lemma A.2 in Páscoa and Seghir (2009).
We have
q jξ∑
g pξg
≤ C jξ + 1r iξ (I1)
∑
η∈ξ+
λ˜ jη A
j
η
bη
≡ m jξ and
∑
g pξg ≥ (1 +
∑
j m
j
ξ )
−1
. unionsq
Observation 1: if C , A and λ are uniformly bounded on the event tree, b ≫ 0 and
the instantaneous utility viξ is node-invariant, then the positive lower bound refereed
to in Lemma 2 is uniform across nodes, denoted by p ∈ R++.
Observation 2: under the conditions in Observation 1, γ iξ has a uniform upper bound
on the event tree, provided that W iξ ≫ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. To shorten the notation, we omit in this proof the dependence
of the Lagrangian on prices (as these are fixed in this proof) and write Liξ (Z) ≡
Liξ (Zξ , Zξ− , γ, p, q, K ).
Let iT (xi , θ i , ϕi , ψ i ) := ∑ξ∈DT viξ (x˜ iξ ) −
∑
ξ∈DT \{xi0}
∑
j∈J (ξ−) λ˜ijξ [ψ ijξ ]+.
Then, iT (Z) − iT (Zi ) ≤ ∑ξ : tξ≤T
(
Liξ (Z) − Liξ (Zi )
)
≤
∑
ξ : tξ≤T
(
Li1 ξ (Z
i
)(Zξ − Ziξ ) + Li2 ξ (Zi )(Zξ−) − Ziξ−)
)
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=
∑
ξ : tξ<T
(
Li1 ξ (Z
i
) +
∑
η∈ξ+
Li2 η(Z
i
)
)
Zξ
+
∑
ξ : tξ=T
Li1 ξ (Z
i
)Zξ −
∑
ξ : tξ=T
Li1 ξ (Z
i
)Ziξ .
Now, the transversality condition (9) implies lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
∑
η∈ξ+ Li2 η(Z
i
)Ziξ
≤ 0. Thus, by (20) and (21), lim sup
T
(
iT (Z) − iT (Zi )
)
≤ lim sup
T
∑
ξ : tξ=T
Li1 ξ (Z
i
)Zξ .
Now, Li1 ξ (Z)Zξ =
(
viξ
′
(Z) − γ iξ pξ
)
xξ − γ iξ qξ θξ +
(
viξ
′
(Z)Cξ − γ iξ (pξCξ −
qξ
)
ϕξ −
(
λ˜ijξ d
i
jξ + ρ jξ − γ iξ
)
ψ ijξ . Here, v
i
ξ
′
(Z) − γ iξ pξ ≤ −
∑
η∈ξ+ γ iη pηYη ≤ 0
and λ˜ijξ d
i
jξ + ρ jξ − γ iξ = 0. unionsq
6.2 On Sect. 4
Lemma 3 Let Wξ = ∑
i
W iξ . Given any bundle κξ ∈ RG++, the directional derivative
(viξ )
′(.)κξ has a positive lower bound ri (κξ ) on the set of bundles {z ∈ RG++ : z ≤ Wξ }.
We can take κξ = I1 or κξ = eξ or even κξ being the gˆ-th canonical vector.
Proof Denote by S(0, h) the sphere with center 0 and radius h and let B(0, h) be the
open ball bounded by S(0, h). For any  > 0 let S˜ be the translation of S(0,Wξ )∩RG+
by the vector εκξ ∈ RG++, that is, S˜ := S(0,Wξ )∩RG+ + εκξ , which is a compact set.
For y ∈ S(0,Wξ )∩ RG+, let Ty be the affine set that runs through y in the direction
of κξ , that is, Ty = {z ∈ RG : z = aκξ + y, for some a}. Let zy be the point where
the line Ty hits the spherical sector S˜. Actually, S˜ is the set of such points zy .
Now, the concavity of vi implies the monotonicity of the directional derivative
(viξ )
′(.)κξ on Ty . Hence, for any z ∈ Ty ∩ B(0,Wξ ) ∩ RG++, we have (viξ )′(z)κξ ≥
(viξ )
′(zy)κξ . We know that (viξ )′(zy)κξ > 0 by monotonicity of vi . Concavity implies
the continuity of directional derivatives and, therefore, we can say that the set Sˆ :=
{(viξ )′(zy)κξ , for some y} is a continuous image of the compact set S˜. Then, Sˆ is a
compact set of positive real numbers, hence it has a positive lower bound, which we
denote by r iξ (κξ ). unionsq
Observation 3: If Wgξ has a uniform upper bound Wg for each good g and the
instantaneous utility viξ is node-invariant, then, given a bundle κ ∈ RG++, the positive
lower bound referred to in Lemma A.1 is uniform across nodes, denoted by r i (κ).
This follows by adapting the proof of the lemma using W instead of Wξ .
Proof of Theorem 2. Both along the sequence of finite economies equilibrium and at
the limit point of the relevant subsequence, we have, by (8), that λijξ < r iξ (eξ ) implies
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λ˜ijξ < γ
i
ξ . It follows, by (5), that ρijξ > 0 and, therefore, the delivery is M jξ ϕijξ− .
Suppose that for any agent (6) cannot hold with d jη = 0, ∀η ∈ ξ+ [otherwise we get
immediately pξC jξ ≥ q jξ , by (6)].
If promise j is traded at ξ , we get K jη = M jηpη A jη for η ∈ ξ+ (along that subsequence
and at its limit point) and (7) holds as equality for some agent. Combining with (8),
we get pξC jξ ≥ q jξ , as for this agent we have:
γ iξ
(
pξC jξ − q jξ
)
≥ v′ξ (xiξ )C jξ +
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη
(
pηYηC jξ − M jη
)
≥ 0, (23)
If promise j is not traded, but was traded along a subsequence (of the above sub-
sequence), the above argument still applies. Otherwise, we can reset K jη = M jηpξ A jξ
[in fact, (7) remains true as we just lower the right hand side]. Now, if (7) holds
with strict inequality for every agent, with K jη = M jηpξ A jξ , we lower q
j
ξ , until
q jξ = maxi
∑
η∈ξ+
γ iη
γ iξ
M jη [notice that (6) still holds, as we just raise the left-hand
side]. The agent(s) for whom this maximum occurs will have (23) satisfied and, there-
fore, pξC jξ ≥ q jξ .
Actually the above resetting of q jξ , K jη and d jη (for η ∈ ξ+) when asset j is not
traded at node ξ , along any subsequence of truncated economies equilibria, could be
done already along the relevant converging subsequence (rather than by modifying
the limit point), so we are back in the exact setting addressed by Theorem 1, knowing
that pξC jξ ≥ q jξ .
When the collateral does not yield any utility gains, condition (11) holds. unionsq
It can be seen from the proof of Theorem 2 that agents who have (7) holding with
equality, for every promise, beyond some node ξ , will have (23) satisfied at these
nodes for all promises and, therefore, have no opportunities for doing generalized
Ponzi schemes. So, only agents that do not purchase some promise at each node
would have an opportunity to do a generalized Ponzi scheme.
Proof of Theorem 3 For the finite-horizon economy, we adapt the proof of Theorem 1
in Dubey et al. (2005). As in their proof the relative prices set is Pξ =
{
(pξ , qξ ) :
∑
g p(ξ, g) = 1, p(ξ, g) ≥ s, q jξ ∈ [0, 1/s]
}
. The correspondence that picks at each
node the relative prices is defined by
τ 0s ≡ arg max∏
ξ∈D
Pξ
{ ∑
ξ∈D
(
pξ ·
∑
i
(xiξ +
∑
j∈J
C jξϕijξ − W iξ ) + qξ ·
∑
i
(θ iξ − ϕiξ )
)}
(24)
Step 1. Now, we select the outcome that makes marginal penalty effects be dominated
by marginal income effects [actually we make (16) hold as an equality]. We do this
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by creating a correspondence that defines what the inverse ιη of the absolute spot
commodity prices sum Sη should be,
τ ιsξ = arg min
(ιη)∈E
[ ∑
η∈ξ+
ιη max
i, j
max{λijη, γ iη}F jη −
∑
η∈ξ+
min
i, j
min{λijη, γ iη}pηYηC jη
]2
(25)
where E = {(ιη)η∈ξ+ : ιη ∈ [0, χξ ]} and χξ =
max
j
∑
η∈ξ+ mini min{λ
i
jη,γ
i
η}pηYηC jξ
min
j
∑
η∈ξ+ maxi max{λ
i
jη,γ iη}F jη
.
Step 2. We accommodate nominal promises in the real promises framework using
the function (ιξ , F jξ ) −→ A jξ g = ιξ F jξ .
The correspondence that picks the repayment rates is defined as
Ks ≡ argmin
{ ∑
η∈ξ+
(
(
∑
i
θ iξ )(1−K jsη)pη A jη−
∑
i
ψ ijη
)2 : K jsη ∈ [0, 1], ∀η∈ξ+
}
(26)
Step 3. Consumers have the standard constrained demand correspondence τ hs =
argmaxZξ
{
i (Z) : (1), (2)and(3)hold at(p, q, K ), given A, forZ = (x, θ, ϕ, ψ)
such that xξ ≤ Wξ (1 + ), ϕijξ ≤ W(1+)max
g
C jgξ
≡ L jξ , θ ijξ ≤ (#I )L jξ , ψ ijξ ≤
(max
g
A jgξ )L
j
ξ , for some  relatively small
}
.
Step 4. Lagrange multipliers are constructed through correspondence IL = ∏
(i,ξ)
ILiξ
where ILiξ = argmin(γ iξ ,ρ jξ )
{
Liξ
(
Ziξ , Z
i
ξ− , pξ , qξ , Kξ , γ
i
ξ , ρξ ) : γ iξ , ρ jξ ≤ γ iξ
}
.
Final step. For each s > 0, a fixed point of τ 0s ×Ks×τ ιs×A×IL×(
∏
h
τ h) exists, as τ ιsξ
is nonempty valued (take ιη = ι, ∀η ∈ ξ+, with ι ≤
min
j∈J∗
∑
η∈ξ+ mini min{λ
i
jη,γ
i
η}pηYηC jξ
max
j∈J∗
∑
η∈ξ+ maxi max{λ
i
jη,γ iη}F jη
)
and upper hemicontinuous.
As in the proof of Theorem 1 in Dubey et al. (2005), when s −→ 0, aggregate excess
demand goes to zero, p(η, g) does not go to zero and qξ stays bounded. Moreover, ιη
stays both bounded from above and bounded away from zero. Passing to subsequences,
we obtain a limit point which is an equilibrium for the finite-horizon economy and
satisfying condition (13), for any (η, j) ∈ D × J ∗, since at Sη = lim ι−1η we have (16)
satisfied.
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